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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION WORKERS UNEMPLOYED BY A MULTI-EMPLOYER LocKoUT - Two unions of
restaurant employees voted to strike the local restaurant industry in order
to obtain a more favorable master contract with a restaurant owners' association. The unions executed this program by strategically calling strikes
on only a few key restaurants. The association retaliated by notifying its
members to lay off their employees in accordance with its previously announced policy to consider a called strike against one member a called
strike against all members. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board held that the union employees laid off in response to the association's notice were "voluntarily'' out of work and therefore were disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits in view of the statutory
disqualification of any worker who "left his work because of a trade dispute."1 In a mandamus proceedings brought by the union employees, the
superior court reversed the appeals board. On appeal to the California
Supreme Court, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Having first used a
work stoppage as an economic weapon, the union employees were responsible for the foreseeable reprisals and were therefore disqualified from unemployment benefits for having voluntarily left their work because of a
trade dispute. Gardner v. State Director of Employment, 53 Cal.2d 23, 346
P.2d 193 (1959).
In the majority of states the statutory labor dispute disqualification
provision is applied as a blanket disqualification to disqualify from unemployment benefits all workers whose unemployment is the result of a

1 CAL. UNEMP. INs. ConE §1262 states: "An individual is not eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits, and no such benefits shall be payable to him, if he left his work
because of a trade dispute."
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labor dispute.2 Generally, no distinction is made between unemployment
resulting from employee strikes and unemployment resulting from employer
lockouts. In eleven states,a however, some attempt has been made to remedy
the inequities of blanket disqualification by granting benefits during a labor
dispute when the responsibility for the unemployment can be traced to the
employer. But there is diversity of opinion among these eleven states with
regard to the proper method of determining such responsibility. For example, the Minnesota courts attempting to determine whether a particular
work stoppage was caused by a strike or by a lockout look only to the final
act which immediately caused the unemployment.4 The Connecticut,ts
Kentucky, 6 Ohio,7 and West Virginia8 courts, on the other hand, look to
whether the employer or the workers were attempting to change the status
quo, that is, the existing terms or conditions of work, by the use of a work
stoppage as economic pressure.9 The approach which has developed in
California toward this problem is somewhat unique. The California labor
dispute disqualification provision does not specifically distinguish between
unemployment resulting from employee strikes and unemployment resulting
from employer lockouts. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has
established a method of fixing the responsibility for the unemployment in
a labor dispute by interpreting the statutory disqualification phrase, "left
his work because of a trade dispute," to mean that the determinative ques2 The draft bill of the Federal Social Security Board, initially adopted by most states,
provides that an individual will be disqualified " ••• for any week with respect to which
••• his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because
of a labor dispute.•.•" SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, DRAFT BILLS FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION OF THE POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER REsERVE ACCOUNT TYPES §5 (d) (rev.
ed. 1937). This provision has been generally interpreted as a blanket disqualification. See,
e.g., Depaoli v. Ernst, 73 Nev. 79, 309 P.2d 363 (1957); Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 Ill.2d 382,
128 N.E.2d 900 (1955). In Arizona, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New York,
unemployment resulting from employer lockouts as well as unemployment resulting from
employee strikes is expressly included in the disqualification provision.
3 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia.
4E.g., Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W.2d 223 (1949).
5 This approach is provided by statute in Connecticut: " .•• any individual whose
unemployment is due to a lockout shall not be disqualified, unless the lockout results from
demands of the employees, as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employer to
deprive employees of some advantage they already possess.•••" CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§31-236 (3) (1958).
6 E.g., Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929 (1940).
7 E.g., Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey, 168 Ohio St. 351, 155 N.E.2d 202 (1958).
s Under the ·west Virginia statute there is no disqualification "if an employer shuts
down his plant or operation or dismisses his employees in order to force wage reduction,
changes in 4ours or working conditions." W. VA. ConE ANN. §2366 (78) (4) (1955).
9 Pennsylvania courts have also applied the status quo test. E.g., McGraw '\\Tool Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa. Super. 9, 106 A.2d 652
(1954). But recent decisions indicate that this test will not be determinative in every case.
E.g., The Punxsutawney Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 188 Pa.
Super. 569, 149 A.2d 683 (1959). The Arkansas and New Hampshire statutes explicitly
exclude lockouts from the disqualification provision but, so far, no cases are available
which indicate what test or tests the Arkansas and New Hampshire courts will apply to
determine the existence of a lockout.
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tion is whether the worker voluntarily left his work because of a trade dispute.10 The principal case is an example of the California approach
extended to the multi-employer lockout situation.
The present diversity of opinion concerning the proper method of determining the responsibility for the unemployment during a labor dispute,
together with the probability of more extensive use of the multi-employer
lockout,U warrants a reappraisal of the labor dispute disqualification problem in terms of the basic purposes of unemployment compensation. The
primary purpose is to provide some measure of subsistence to workers involuntarily out of work; 12 a secondary purpose is to provide a buffer to
cyclical economic declines by assuring continued purchasing power to one
segment of the population,13 It would seem that a proper corollary of these
purposes is the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of employer-employee differences.1 4 Weighed against these purposes and this corollary is
the legal sanction of the use of strikes and lockouts as economic weapons in
the collective bargaining arena. Consequently, the major difficulty encountered by the courts in attempting to fix the responsibility for unemployment
for labor dispute disqualification purposes is to avoid interfering with the
collective bargaining process without making unemployment compensation
subservient to collective bargaining. This difficulty can be appreciably
minimized without submitting to the inequities of the blanket disqualification if the labor dispute disqualification is directed only to situations in
10 The "volitional" test was first enunciated in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935 (1941). See also Chrysler Corp. v.
California Employment Stabilization Commission, 116 Cal. App.2d 8, 253 P.2d 68 (1953);
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal.2d 239, 209 P .2d
602 (1949); Bunny's Walle Shop v. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal.2d 735, 151
P.2d 224 (1944). The McKinley case is noted in 35 CORNELL L.Q. 657 (1950); 63 HARv. L.
REV. 716 (1950); 2 STAN. L. REv. 427 (1950). For a thorough discussion of the California
court and board decisions, see Feldman, Unemployment Insurance: Its Effect on Trade
Disputes in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 604 (1958). Interpreting a statute which disqualifies workers who are unemployed because of a "strike," Utah adopted the California
test. See Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525,243 P.2d 951
(1952). Colorado, however, applies the status quo test to a similar "strike" disqualification
provision. See Sandoval v. Industrial Commission, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942).
11 The use of the multi-employer lockout to preserve the multi-employer bargaining
basis has been recently approved by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Local
449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
12 This purpose is stated in the declaration of policy section of most statutes. E.g.,
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §100. See also DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 59
(1933). J\Iany writers, however, have doubted that this is actually the underlying theme.
See, e.g., Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17
U. Cm. L. REv. 294 (1950); Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 167 (1945). Nevertheless, the courts have not disputed it. See, e.g., Alamada v.
Administrator, 137 Conn. 380, 77 A.2d 765 (1951). The difference of opinion, however, seems
to be more one of semantics than of basic disagreement. See Sanders, Disqualification for
UnemplO)•ment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307,316 (1955).
13 See Williams, Labor Dispute Disqualification -A Primer and Some Problems, 8
VAND. L. REv. 338,368 (1955).
14 See the penetrating analysis of Justice Crockett concurring in Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra note 10.
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which the workers have placed themselves outside of the purposes of unemployment compensation, that is, when the workers are voluntarily unemployed. If this is to be the test, "voluntary" must be accorded a workable
meaning. It should be recognized that the voluntary nature of the workers'
actions can be objectively and practically determined only if proper recognition is given to the legal status of the authorized collective bargaining
agent of the workers and if the voluntary nature of the workers' actions is
accordingly fixed by reference to the acts of the collective bargaining agent
performed in their behalf. But how far into the facts of the labor dispute
itself the courts should look in order to make an objective determination of
voluntary or involuntary unemployment seems to be an area of basic disagreement among the courts. The California courts, as demonstrated in the
principal case, assess the responsibility against the party who first takes the
dispute away from the bargaining table by applying economic pressure. In
this way the courts can seek the party who was willing to assume the responsibility for the immediate unemployment and the risk of reprisals which
produce further unemployment. The workers are denied benefits only if
they are this party. Such a determination provides an objective answer to
the question of voluntary or involuntary unemployment with a minimum
of interference with collective bargaining. It fosters the peaceful settlement
of differences without arbitrarily denying benefits to the workers if peaceful
negotiations break down. The other tests in use do not achieve such satisfactory results. The "final act" test of the Minnesota courts, excluding
blindly all but the final act from consideration, fails to produce any realistic
determination of voluntary or involuntary unemployment. Further, it is
particularly objectionable because it tends to encourage wasteful tactical
maneuvering by both parties in an attempt to place the other party in the
position of responsibility for the final act.11• The "status quo" test, too, is
inadequate for it causes the determination to turn on the question of which
party was attempting to change the status quo, a criterion which may well be
completely unrelated to whether the workers were involuntarily unemployed.16 A final alternative, decision on the merits of the labor dispute
itself, has been suggested by some writers as the ultimate test.17 But such a
test would, in effect, place the administrative agency or the court in the
position of an arbitrator in every dispute. The tribunal would have to
15 See

Note, 35

CORNELL

L.Q. 657 (1950).

16 See Shadur, supra note 12, at 306.
17 See, e.g., Shadur, supra note 12. But the courts have generally held that the statute
prohibits examination of the merits. E.g., The Punxsutawney Co. v. Unemployment Compenastion Board of Review, supra note 9. Two writers have advocated a limited determination of the merits in order to grant benefits when the employer has acted unlawfully or has
breached his contract and the employees walk out. Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification -A Primer and Some Problems, 8 VAND. L. REv. 338 (1955); Comment, 49
MICH. L. REv. 886 (1951). The determination of the merits approach referred to in the
text of this note is that advocated in a general case where the employer has not acted
unlawfully or breached his contract.
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decide in each case whether the workers were justified in their actions and
therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. Such a decision interferes with
the collective bargaining process and goes beyond what is required for labor
dispute disqualification purposes. In addition, it may not be possible in
every case to decide whether the workers are justified in their actions since,
in many cases, the answer will depend upon subjective opinion. Of all these
approaches, the one used by the California Supreme Court in the principal
case appears to adhere best to the purposes of unemployment compensation
in a manner which is sound and workable in theory and practice.
James B. Blanchard, S. Ed.

